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Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of
International Trade
Alan 0. Sykest
A wide arrayof policy instruments can protect domestic firms againstforeign competition. Regulatory measuresthat raisethe costs offoreign firms relative to domestic firms are
exceptionally wasteful protectionist devices, however, with deadweight costs that can
greatly exceed those of traditionalprotectionist instruments such as tariffs and quotas.
This Article develops the welfare economics of regulatoryprotectionismand a relatedpolitical economy analysis of the national and internationallegal systems that must confront it,
including the WTO, the NAFTA, the European Union, and the United States federal system. It explains why regulatorymeasures that serve no purpose other than to protect domestic firms againstforeign competition will generally be prohibited in politically sophisticated
trade agreements, even when other instruments of protectionare to a degree permissible. It
further suggests why regulatory measures that serve honest, non-protectionist objectives
will be permissible in sophisticated trade agreements even though theirregulatory benefits
may be small and their adverse effect on trade may be great-thatis, it explains why trade
agreementsgenerally do not authorize "balancinganalysis"akin to that undertaken in certain dormantcommerce clause cases under U.S. law.

Among the most vexing and persistent disputes in modern
international commercial relations involves a European prohibition on the sale of beef from animals treated with certain growth
hormones. The use of hormones to fatten beef cattle is widespread
in the United States, and hence the European regulation affects
United States beef exporters significantly.' The United States has
t Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I have received useful comments on earlier versions of this paper from Lucian Bebchuk, Louis
Kaplow, and from seminar participants at Columbia, Harvard, NYU, and the annual
meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. I am grateful to the Bradley
and Scaife Foundations for financial support.
1 For a description of the early history of the dispute, see Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Unfair Trade Practices;European Community Hormones Directive,
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maintained that the prohibition is disguised protectionism designed to benefit European beef producers, while the European
Union has insisted that it is a sensible public health measure designed to protect its citizens against the possible risks of ingesting hormone residues. After many years of bilateral wrangling,2
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") has now ruled that the
European regulation is not reasonably necessary to the attainment of a legitimate health objective and, consequently, that it
violates WTO law.' The dispute continues, however, as the
United States and the European Union debate what must be
done to bring Europe's behavior into compliance with WTO law.
The "beef hormones" decision raises many interesting legal
and factual issues. This Article, however, focuses on a broader
puzzle, a puzzle that is nicely illustrated by the legal rules governing transatlantic trade in beef. Although Europe has now been
told that its beef hormone regulations are an unjustified protectionist measure that violates international law, it continues to
maintain a hefty tariff on imported beef products.4 Further,
should beef imports in the future exceed a specified increase over
historical levels, an additional and substantial "special safeguard" tariff may be imposed.5 Likewise, should increased im52 Fed Reg 45304 (1987).
2

The dispute began in 1985 when, in conjunction with its ban on the domestic use of

growth hormones, the European Community banned the importation of beef from nations
that permit growth hormones to be given to cattle for human consumption. This import
ban was to become effective in 1988. Id. The United States complained, and subsequent
European intransigence led President Reagan to impose retaliatory tariffs against European exports under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Presidential Proclamation 5759,
Increasingthe Rate of Duty on Certain Products of the European Community, 3 CFR 1987
Comp 189. The European Union later modified its regulation to permit beef imports from
countries that allow the use of growth hormones if the imported beef could nevertheless be
certified as hormone-free. But because compliance with the certification process was expensive, and much United States beef still was excluded by it, the United States continued
its retaliatory tariffs for certain imports although suspending the increased duty for others. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Modification to the Determination To Impose Increased Duties on CertainProducts of the European Community, 54 Fed
Reg 31398 (1989).
See WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA, Aug 18, 1997; EC
Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body,
WTIDS26/AB/R, Jan 16, 1998. Both are available online at <http'//www.wto.orgwto/ddf/
ep/public.html> (visited Nov 10, 1998).
For example, the tariff on carcasses or half carcasses is presently 20 percent plus
2763 ECU per ton, which will gradually decline to 12.8 percent plus 1768 ECU per ton in
accordance with European tariff concessions negotiated during the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. See WTO, 19 Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April
1994 16212 (1994).
' See id; WTO, Agreement on Agriculture, Art 5, reprinted in John H. Jackson, Wil-
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ports of beef "cause or threaten serious injury" to the European
beef industry, Europe would be entitled to use temporary additional protective tariffs or quantitative ceilings on imports (quotas) to remedy the problem.' And finally, Europe (like the United
States) maintains hefty farm subsidies. To cattle growers in particular, Europe is permitted to bestow an annual subsidy of
nearly 2 billion ECU without violating its commitments to limit
agricultural subsidies.' Needless to say, subsidies too are a form
of protectionism that lower costs for domestic producers and allow them to compete more effectively against imports.
What is going on here? Why are protective tariffs, subsidies,
and quotas (under specified circumstances) perfectly legal under
WTO law, while protectionism in the form of a regulatory measure such as the hormones regulation is illegal? This Article undertakes to answer this question using some rudimentary economics of international trade melded with simple public choice
theory.
Some terminology is useful at the outset. Government regulation of product markets9 can increase the costs of production
for firms outside of the regulating jurisdiction ("foreign firms")
more than it increases costs for firms inside the regulating jurisdiction ("domestic firms") and thereby confer a competitive advantage on domestic firms. I define "regulatory protectionism" as
any cost disadvantage imposed on foreign firms by a regulatory
policy that discriminates against them or that otherwise disadvantages them in a manner that is unnecessary to the attainment
of some genuine, nonprotectionist regulatory objective. Regulatory protectionism can result either from substantive regulatory
requirements or from the mechanisms used by regulators to ensure compliance with substantive requirements (the "conformity
assessment" process). It need not be deliberate and may result
liam J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, 1995 Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of InternationalEconomic Relations 100-02 (West 3d ed 1995) ("Documents Supplement").
6 See GATT 1947, as amended, Art XIX, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 44-45
(cited in note 5).
See WTO, 19 Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round at
16955 (cited in note 4).
' Throughout this Article, I use the term "regulation" as it is used in the WTO agreements, to refer to policies promulgated by governments with which compliance is mandatory. Regulations should be distinguished from "standards," with which compliance is voluntary and which may result from either government or private sector activity. See Alan
0. Sykes, Product Standardsfor InternationallyIntegrated Goods Markets 13-14 (Brookings 1995).
Much of what I have to say bears on government regulation of service industries, labor markets, the environment, and similar areas, but these topics raise distinct issues
that I will not address directly in this Article.
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simply from regulators' failure to appreciate the trade impact of
their policies.
To give a few examples, a nation may regulate the pharmaceutical market by requiring government approval of new drugs
before they may be sold. If, however, the regulatory authorities
require foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers to engage in more
testing and clinical trials than domestic manufacturers with no
apparent health justification for this difference in treatment,
regulatory protectionism arises. Similarly, a policy prohibiting
the use of some food preservative in imported foodstuffs, but allowing its use domestically, would constitute regulatory protectionism.
Such cases of overt discrimination provide the clearest examples, but, as the beef hormones case illustrates, facially nondiscriminatory policies may also constitute regulatory protectionism. The European regulation at issue in the beef hormones
case imposes a cost disadvantage on foreign suppliers from nations that permit the use of growth hormones, because it requires
them to undertake costly measures to certify their exports as
hormone-free.' European beef producers, however, need not concern themselves with the measures, because hormones are purportedly not used at all in Europe. And because this cost disadvantage results from a regulation that is not necessary to attain
any legitimate public health objective (according to WTO findings), it constitutes "regulatory protectionism" as defined in this
Article.
It is easy to imagine other examples of facially neutral regulatory protectionism. Transportation regulators might require
that all new automobiles sold in the domestic market be equipped
with a particular type of airbag that is only manufactured domestically, even though other types of airbags manufactured abroad
(and available more cheaply to foreign automobile manufacturers) are just as safe and effective. Or regulators might require all
products of a certain type to be tested at a particular laboratory
that surreptitiously expedites the processing of domestic goods,
even though other laboratories could perform the job adequately.
By contrast, some regulations have a protective effect (raising the costs of foreign firms more than the costs of domestic
firms), but are nondiscriminatory and necessary to attain a
genuine, nonprotectionist regulatory objective. In legal parlance,
10The certification process is expensive because cattle growers must keep track of

which animals have been treated, make sure that the animals' carcasses are segregated at
the packing house, and provide supporting documentation as required.
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they might be called the "least restrictive means" to obtain that
objective. For example, a nation may wish to attain a higher level
of air quality than others and may require all automobiles sold in
the domestic market to meet comparatively stringent hydrocarbon emissions standards. Foreign manufacturers may have
higher unit costs of compliance-perhaps they sell few vehicles
into the country in question and thus are unable to reap the same
scale economies or learning-by-doing economies in regulatory
compliance that accrue to domestic firms with larger sales volumes. But if the regulation is nondiscriminatory and no less restrictive alternative is available to meet air quality goals, then
the measure does not constitute regulatory protectionism as defined in this Article.
So defined, regulatory protectionism is economically inefficient, in part for the same reasons that protectionism of any sort
is inefficient. Protectionism draws high cost domestic firms into
the market while excluding low cost foreign firms, and it prices
out of the market some consumers who would be willing to purchase goods at a price exceeding the marginal cost of production
of efficient suppliers." What previous work has not appreciated,
however, is that in most cases regulatory protectionism causes
additional deadweight losses that make it considerably more inefficient than other instruments of protection such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. Accordingly, the societal returns to legal constraints on regulatory protectionism are greater, other things
being equal, than the societal returns to constraints on other protectionist instruments. This proposition, developed in Section I, is
the principal normative point of this Article.
Section II develops some connected, positive claims about the
law of international trade. The analysis draws on a blend of public choice theory and the theory of optimal contracts. It posits that
trade agreements may be understood as sophisticated contracts
among the self-interested political officials representing each
member nation. These actors are not concerned with "welfare
maximization," as that phrase is conventionally used by economists, but with the maximization of their own political fortunes
as measured by votes, campaign contributions, and the like. 2
" See, for example, Peter B. Kenen, The InternationalEconomy 17-19, 175-77 (Prentice-Hall 1985) (showing how opening trade by removing tariffs or quotas will increase
consumer surplus in excess of any decrease in producer surplus). Section I of this Article
also elaborates on the economic inefficiencies associated with protectionism.
' Other papers that draw on this perspective to explain important aspects of the law
of international trade include Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionismas a "Safeguard":A Positive
Analysis of the GATT "EscapeClause"with Normative Speculations, 58 U Chi L Rev 255,
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This perspective, when melded with the welfare analysis in Section I, yields two sets of insights.
First, from a political standpoint, regulatory protectionism is
an inferior form of protectionism for nations that are unconstrained in their trade policies. But after a nation enters into a
trade agreement, circumstances may arise that tempt political officials to employ regulatory protectionism due to constraints on
their ability to use other preferred protectionist instruments. It is
in the mutual interest of political actors who bind themselves to
trade agreements to disable themselves from behaving in this
fashion if possible and to encourage renegotiation of the agreedupon constraints on the politically "efficient" instruments of protection instead. Further, the degree of trade protection afforded
by regulatory measures may be difficult to quantify, and the
transaction costs of reciprocal trade negotiations can be lowered if
protectionism is restricted to more transparent instruments such
as tariffs. This line of reasoning affords a "political economy" explanation for the fact that regulatory protectionism is prohibited
under the treaty creating the WTO even though various other
forms of protectionism are permissible (albeit subject to constraint). The lesson here is but a special case of a more general
insight developed in the literature on public choice and regulation-where the self-interest of political actors requires an inefficient transfer of rents to well-organized interest groups (here,
domestic industries that seek insulation from foreign competition), it is often best to make that inefficient transfer as efficiently as possible.13
Second, regulations that are nondiscriminatory and necessary to the attainment of legitimate, nonprotectionist regulatory
objectives will not be prohibited in politically savvy trade agreements. Such measures will be permitted (although they will be a
possible subject of future trade negotiations) even though the
burden on international commerce may be great and the domestic
regulatory benefits may be small. The political economy explana274-78 (1991) (using public choice theory to help explain the existence of the GATT escape
clause); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and CountervailingDuty
Cases, 16 Intl Rev L & Econ 5 (1996) (evaluating injury analysis in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases from the perspectives of welfare economics and public choice
theory); Warren F. Schwartz and Alan 0. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System, 16 Intl Rev L &
Econ 27 (1996) (using public choice theory to explain the most favored nation provision of
the GATT and its exceptions).
" See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L
& Econ 211 (1976); Gary Becker, Comment, 19 J L & Econ 245 (1976) (evaluating Peltzman).
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tion for this claim rests on the disjunction between economic efficiency and political efficacy, and the extreme difficulty of fashioning legal rules to identify measures that are politically undesirable from the perspective of trade negotiators even though essential to domestic regulatory goals. Accordingly, politically savvy
parties to trade agreements will prefer to negotiate directly over
such measures rather than entrust their policing to courts or
similar tribunals. The law of the WTO is again consistent with
this claim, as the legality of regulatory measures in no way turns
on a "balancing" of regulatory benefits and commercial burdens.
Section III concludes with some comparative observations on
the treatment of protective regulations in other legal systems, including the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
the European Union, and the United States federal system. The
treatment of regulatory protectionism in each legal environment
is quite similar to that of the WTO-all systems tend to prohibit
it. The treatment of nondiscriminatory regulatory measures that
have protective effects but are essential to the promotion of legitimate regulatory objectives varies slightly more across systems; for the most part, however, the treatment is similar to that
of the WTO. Hence, all four systems that I examine appear
broadly consistent with the political economy analysis.
I. THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY PROTECTIONISM
Governments have an array of devices at their disposal for
protecting domestic industries against outside competition. Taxes
on imports (tariffs), restrictions on the quantity of imports (quotas), and subsidies to domestic producers are common instruments of protection. Regulations that disadvantage foreign suppliers relative to domestic firms are a fourth option. Still others
can be imagined.
These alternative instruments of protection are by no means
equivalent. In particular, although tariffs, quotas, and subsidies
can be quite similar in their impact on welfare (though not identical), regulatory protectionism is systematically more pernicious,
often by a wide margin. A simple, partial equilibrium comparison
of policy instruments makes the point.
Figure I depicts a competitive market for a single good in an
importing nation. To keep the diagram as simple as possible, I
make the "small country" assumption and imagine that the importing nation can purchase all of the good that it wishes from
abroad at the "world price" P. Nothing essential would change,
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however, if I assumed instead that the supply curve for the imported good were upward sloping.' 4 The domestic supply curve
(initially) is S, and the domestic demand curve is D. With no intervention into the market by the government, total consumption
would be determined by the intersection of the demand curve D
with a horizontal line at the world price P (the horizontal distance Pf). Domestic firms would supply a quantity equal to Pe,
and imports would supply the remaining consumer demand ef.
Domestic consumer surplus would equal hfP, while domestic producer surplus would equal Pge.

P+t
P

0

Q

Q,
Figure I

1 The assumption of a perfectly elastic (flat) import supply curve here is unrealistic in
an important sense-all costs of protectionism will be passed through to domestic consumers, and hence foreign suppliers will have no reason to complain about it. International
rules restricting protectionism exist, of course, precisely because foreign suppliers do care
about it. But as indicated in the text, the essential insight that I wish to develop with Figure I-that regulatory protectionism is typically far more damaging to social welfare than
other forms of protectionism-holds regardless of whether the import supply curve is flat
or upward sloping, and the "small country" assumption allows the reasoning to be presented in a diagram that is far less cumbersome.
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Let us suppose, however, that the government decides to protect the domestic industry so that it can achieve a higher level of
profit or employment. For concreteness, suppose that the government wishes to confer surplus on domestic producers in an
amount Pai, or that it wishes to induce domestic output of Q
(both options result in the same surplus for domestic firms). Consider the government's options. A tariff equal to t on all units of
the imported good will increase the price of the good to consumers
to the level P+t. Consumption will then equal Q', with domestic
production of Q and imports of Q'-Q. Domestic producer surplus
rises to (P+t)bg,which is equal to Pai. Consumer surplus has
fallen to (P+t)ch, but government revenue on the Q'-Q units of
imports is now (Q'-Q)t, equal to the area abcd. Making the welfare comparison to the level of surplus that exists without government intervention, the sum of consumer surplus, producer
surplus, and government revenue is now less by the two "deadweight loss" triangles eba and cdf.
As an alternative to a tariff, the government might impose a
quota restricting imports to Q'-Q. Price would rise and the market would clear when domestic production reached Q at the price
P+t. Such a quota would have the same impact on consumer and
producer surplus as the tariff of , but it would not generate any
revenue for the government (unless the rights to import under
the quota were auctioned). Instead, the "quota rents" abcd, equal
to the tariff revenue under the tariff system, would be captured
by the entities with the right to import under the quota. For example, if admission to the domestic market were offered to the
foreign sellers that were first in line, those sellers would be able
to command the elevated price P+t for their merchandise and
would receive an additional t per unit by comparison to the scenario without government intervention. The difference between
the tariff and the quota, therefore, is not in the amount of surplus, but in who captures it.15
A third option is a subsidy. If the government offers domestic
producers a payment equal to t per unit of output, the effect is to
"This proposition oversimplifies but does no harm for present purposes. Important
differences do exist between tariffs and quotas, for example, in imperfectly competitive
markets. The notion that quotas are no worse than tariffs from a welfare standpoint in
competitive markets is also questionable under many circumstances. For example, when
quotas are allocated among supplier countries, they may not replicate the market shares
that each nation would obtain under a most-favored-nation tariff system. Additional
deadweight losses can then result because imported goods are no longer obtained from the
most efficient suppliers. Such considerations may help to explain the general preference

within the WTO system for tariffs over quotas, but nothing in the analysis to follow turns
on such matters.
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shift the supply curve downward to S'. The domestic industry will
produce Q and earn a surplus equal to Pai, while imports will
equal af. Here, consumer surplus no longer declines relative to
the scenario without intervention, but deadweight loss remains
nonetheless. The reason is that government now makes an expenditure on the subsidy equal to Qt, which is equal to the area
bgia. Part of this amount-geai-is a transfer to domestic producers that increases their surplus. The remainder, equal to the
area of the triangle eba, is deadweight loss. Though not reflected
in the diagram, a further deadweight loss exists as a result of the
taxes necessary to raise the government revenue for the subsidy.
When this factor is added to the analysis, it is apparent that one
cannot rank the welfare effects of subsidies, tariffs, or quotas.
Plausibly, their effects are similar in many settings, and any differences will depend on the circumstances.
Now consider a fourth option-a regulatory measure calculated to disadvantage foreign suppliers. Such a measure might
take many forms, as indicated in the introduction, but for concreteness let us suppose that the government announces the following policy: Any foreign supplier who desires to sell a unit of
the good in the market of the importing nation must provide an
agent to sit on a flagpole for one hour and cluck like a chicken.
Let us further assume that the market wage for an hour of sitting
and clucking is t."6 Foreign suppliers who can sell elsewhere at
the price P will now demand P+t to sell in this market. The market will once again clear at that price, just as in the case of the
tariff and the quota. Imports will equal Q'-Q and domestic production will equal Q. Consumer surplus will be the same as in the
case of the tariff or quota, and domestic producer surplus will be
the same. But now the deadweight loss may be far greater than it
is with the other protectionist instruments. Instead of the triangles eba and cdf, it will equal the entire area ebcf if we assume
that the agent who sits and clucks earns no surplus because he
can command a wage of t per hour elsewhere (if the regulation
merely diverts that agent from some productive activity with
wage t so that the agent receives no real benefit from the government's regulatory protectionism).
16 There is no loss of generality in this formulation. Whatever the precise form of

regulatory protectionism, t simply represents the unit cost of resources consumed for the
purpose of compliance with the protectionist regulation. It can be a direct expenditure as
in my hypothetical, an opportunity cost (such as the foregone interest on the value of imported goods that sit around awaiting inspection or certification), or depreciation in the
value of the goods themselves (as when delay in customs processing causes loss of perishable merchandise).
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The difference between the regulatory measure and the alternative instruments of protection (tariffs, subsidies, and quotas) is that an amount equal to the area of the rectangle abcd is
preserved as surplus for somebody under each of the alternative
instruments. The government captures it as tariff revenue under
the tariff option, consumers retain it under the subsidy option,
and whoever holds the rights to import captures it under the
quota option. Under the regulatory option, by contrast, the surplus can be completely destroyed because of the socially wasted
expenditure of t per unit of imports.
This analysis requires two caveats. First, if the mandated increase in costs under regulation confers surplus on someone (such
as the clucker, in my example), the additional deadweight loss
from regulatory protectionism will be smaller than the full regulatory compliance cost per unit. But it will be the rare case in
which additional waste is absent. Thus, suppose that the wage of
t is better than the wage that the clucker can earn elsewhere (call
it w). Then, a rectangle of surplus equal to (t-w)(Q'-Q) will be
transferred to cluckers, and the additional deadweight loss from
regulatory protectionism will be less than abcd-to be precise, it
will equal w(Q'-Q). Only if w is zero, however, will the welfare
loss from regulatory protectionism be no worse than the welfare
loss from other forms of protectionism. That is, unless the resources consumed by regulatory protectionism have zero value in
alternative uses-a situation that should be very much the exception rather than the rule-regulatory protectionism will destroy
more surplus than other protectionist instruments. 7
Second, the "rectangle" of surplus that is preserved under the
tariff, quota, or subsidy option may be the target of rent seeking
by interest groups, and their expenditures in pursuit of that surplus may represent a social cost. With the tariff, for example, interest groups may expend resources lobbying the government to
transfer the tariff revenue to them through some new government expenditure program. Or with the quota, interest groups
hoping to obtain the right to import under the quota, and the associated quota rent, may spend resources lobbying for that right.
Consequently, some of the rectangle will likely be dissipated
through efforts by interest groups to secure it. But it seems exceedingly unlikely that this possibility could reverse the conclusion that regulatory protectionism is worse from a welfare stand" Of course, if regulatory protectionism creates insurmountable hurdles to imports
that no resource expenditure could overcome, it is no different in its welfare consequences
than a prohibitive tariff or an import quota of zero.
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point than other forms of protectionism. Rational interest groups
will not spend more on efforts to secure the surplus than the expected returns from those expenditures, and hence we would expect their total expenditures to be less than the surplus at stake
(in other words, less than the area of the rectangle abcd)-rent
seekers on average should earn at least a competitive rate of return on their efforts. Further, interest group expenditures in pursuit of the available surplus will often involve transfers (for example, campaign contributions) rather than expenditures that
amount to deadweight loss. For these reasons, rent seeking almost certainly will not dissipate the entire "rectangle" that the
tariff, quota, or subsidy otherwise preserves. By contrast, regulatory protectionism can destroy all of it. And where it does notbecause it confers surplus on the factors of production used in
regulatory compliance (the first caveat above)-rent seeking by
the beneficiaries of regulatory protectionism will dissipate a portion of their surplus as well. Hence, the net social surplus (left
over after all deadweight costs from rent seeking have been netted out) should still be systematically greater with a tariff, quota,
or subsidy than with regulatory protectionism. 8
The lessons here are general. Although my hypothetical
clucking requirement is rather silly and implausible, regulatory
protectionism, as I have defined it, is the economic equivalent. By
definition, it raises the costs of foreign suppliers (or the domestic
importers with whom they deal) by inducing an expenditure of
resources for no purpose (or with no effect) other than to raise the
price of imported goods. Whether those resources are consumed
in superfluous inspection services, pointless labeling or "safety"
requirements, or unnecessary requirements that foreign sellers
establish a domestic "presence," the economic analysis remains
the same. A comparable degree of protection against foreign competition could be achieved, at lower economic cost, by employing
one of the more efficient protectionist instruments. Accordingly, if
protectionism is to be tolerated at all, societal economic welfare
will be greater if it is channeled into the less destructive devices
for achieving it.
"8Put more formally, suppose that rent-seeking expenditures by interest groups destroy some fixed proportion x of the surplus potentially available to those interest groups,
where x < 1. The assumption that x < 1 is compelling, for otherwise rent-seeking expenditures would be irrational. Assume further that this proportion x is constant across all of
the protectionist options-tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and regulation. It follows that regulatory protectionism is inferior from a welfare standpoint to the alternatives as long as some
of the rectangle abcd is consumed in regulatory compliance costs-had that part of the
rectangle been preserved under a tariff, quota, or subsidy, only the fraction x of it would
have been destroyed through rent seeking.
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II. POSITiVE THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF
WTO OBLIGATIONS
The WTO, which supplants the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), embodies detailed commitments on
scores of issues spanning hundreds of pages of legal text and additional thousands of pages of product by product, service sector
by service sector, and country by country obligations. 9 My focus
here is on a subset of the provisions contained in these agreements-those pertaining to traditional instruments of protection
such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies on the one hand, and those
pertaining to regulatory protectionism in product markets on the
other. The goal is to explain the structure of these provisions using a blend of public choice theory (or political economy theory)
and the theory of optimal contracts.
Before developing the theoretical analysis, however, I will lay
out the legal landscape. Section A considers the WTO rules regarding tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. It discusses how the WTO
agreements permit signatories to employ these traditional instruments of protection, albeit subject to substantial limitations,
including some that preclude the introduction of new tariffs, quotas, or subsidies that would frustrate the expectations created by
reciprocal trade concessions. Section B then argues that the WTO
agreements prohibit regulatory protectionism, as I have defined
it, in goods sectors. By contrast, regulatory measures that have
protective effects but that are also necessary to the achievement
of an apparently genuine regulatory objective other than protectionism are allowed.
The theoretical analysis is developed in Section C. My essential claim is that this structure of permissible and impermissible
protectionism can be understood as a part of an optimal "contract" among self-interested political actors.
A. The WTO Rules on Tariffs, Quotas, and Subsidies
The heart of the GATT-predecessor to the WTO-was a set
of reciprocal commitments among signatories to lower their tariffs below the high levels that had emerged in the 1930s. Pursuant to these "tariff bindings," nations covenanted product by
product not to charge a tariff above the negotiated "bound rate."'
See Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,reprinted in Documents
Supplement at 3-14 (cited in note 5).
20 The modem counterpart of the GATT legal obligation not to charge a tariff above
the bound rate is created by GATT 1994, Art II, itself a part of the WTO agreements.
GATT 1994 is reprinted in Documents Supplement at 79-96 (cited in note 5). Articles in-
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Periodic negotiations throughout the history of the GATT and the
WTO have produced a steady reduction of the bound rates on
most goods imported into most countries (less so in developing
countries). But tariffs are not illegal. Rather, signatories have a
right to charge any tariff they want unless they have negotiated a
binding with respect to the particular good in question. Further,
upward, at a price of course, if nabindings can be renegotiated
21
tions find them too low.
The drafters of the original GATT recognized that tariff
commitments would be of little value if signatories could substitute quotas instead. Accordingly, to protect expectations under
the tariff bindings, the GATT contained a general prohibition of
2
But this prohibition was
quotas that carried over into the WTOY.
subject to a number of exceptions relating to, inter alia, the use of
quotas to ensure the efficacy of agricultural price support
schemes, to overcome balance of payments difficulties, to protect
declining industries, and to protect human, animal, and plant life
or health. 24 The drafters even included an elaborate provision on
how to administer quotas to avoid undue trade discrimination,
anticipating that quotas would be used regularly despite the gen2
Thus, like tariffs, quotas are in no meaningful
eral prohibitionY.
sense illegal, and they remain in use by many countries in many
goods sectors. Quotas are, however, quite constrained and are not

corporated into GATT 1994 from GATT 1947 are reprinted in Documents Supplement at
15-78. The term "tariff binding" refers to a negotiated tariff ceiling; the term 'bound rate"
is the amount of the tariff permitted under that ceiling.
1 See GATT 1994, Art XXVII (cited in note 20).
' Indeed, some skeptical readers may wonder whether any of the rules of the system
are really "binding" and meaningful, since members of the WTO can always quit and pursue whatever policies they wish or violate their obligations to see what happens. I (and
others) have argued elsewhere, however, that the level of compliance with WTO rules is
quite high because of the damage to reputation and the prospect of trade sanctions that
attend deviation from the rules, and the importance to each member of retaining the benefits of the bargain. See Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International
Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L & Pol Intl Bus 263, 266
(1992); Frieder Roessler, Warren F. Schwartz, and Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure
of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System 15-24, unpublished
manuscript (on file with U Chi L Rev); Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding:Less Is More, 90 Am J Intl L 416 (1996). For details on the structure of
dispute resolution under the WTO and the sanctions that may attend violation, see generally WTO, Annex 2, Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of
Disputes,reprinted in Documents Supplement at 366-90 (cited in note 5).
' See GATT 1994, Art XI (cited in note 20); Agreement Establishingthe World Trade
Organization,Art II (cited in note 19).
See, for example, GATT 1994, Arts XI (agricultural price support schemes), XII
(balance of payments), XIX (declining industries), XX (protection of human, animal, and
plant life or health) (cited in note 20).
' See id Art XIII.
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to be used unless they can be justified under one of the exceptions
to the general prohibition. Further, in some instances, the introduction of a new quota will trigger a requirement that trading
partners be "compensated" (through alternative trade concessions) for the adverse impact on their exports.26
Much the same thing may be said about subsidies. The original GATT agreement provided that subsidies to domestic producers, with the exception of subsidies applicable only to exports,
were generally exempt from legal restrictions." The signatories
quickly realized that a new subsidy to domestic firms could frustrate the market access expectations under a tariff binding and
thus developed a rule that new subsidies to domestic producers of
goods covered by tariff bindings are impermissible unless adequate trade compensation is paid.28 The GATT also authorized
unilateral countermeasures against subsidized imports known as
"countervailing duties," which a signatory could use at its discretion if subsidized imports were "such as to cause or threaten material injury" to domestic competitors.2 9 But there was no attempt
in the original GATT or during its subsequent evolution to prohibit subsidies in general. And, although the WTO introduced
some new and quite interesting constraints on subsidies, they are
still tolerated in many settings even if their only apparent justification is to insulate domestic firms from foreign competition (especially in the agricultural sector). Thus, like tariffs and quotas,
subsidies are not in general illegal, but they are constrained in
important ways, particularly insofar as nations may wish to introduce new subsidies for products with bound tariffs.
B. The WTO Rules on Regulatory Protectionism
Regulatory impediments to trade have been a subject of considerable and growing negotiation throughout the history of the
GATT and the WTO. During the recent Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, two extensive agreements concerning
See, for example, id Art XIX.
See GAIr 1947, Arts IHI(8)(b) (exempting subsidies to domestic producers), XVI (exempting subsidies applicable only to exports from the Art IH(8)(b) exemption) (cited in
note 6).
See, for example, EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paidto Processorsand Producers
of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, 37th Supp GAT BISD (1991), excerpted in
John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations 357-62 (West 3d ed 1995).
See GATT 1994, Art VI, 6 (cited in note 20). Countervailing duty was defined as "a
special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or
indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise." Id Art VI,

13.
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regulatory barriers to trade were concluded-the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement")3 ° and the
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPM Agreement"). 1 The SPM Agreement, part of
the Agreement on Agriculture, primarily concerns measures to
protect human, plant, or animal health from hazards relating to
agricultural products-food safety regulations being the paradigmatic example. The TBT Agreement applies to all other product market regulations.
Although the term "regulatory protectionism" is mine and is
found nowhere in the text of the WTO accords, the TBT and SPM
Agreements nevertheless prohibit regulatory protectionism as
here defined in product markets. The legal principles that accomplish this task may be broken down into six categories.
1.

Facial discrimination: The national treatment principle.

It is exceedingly difficult to imagine a principled justification
for substantive regulatory requirements that apply to foreign
firms only. The conformity assessment system for foreign merchandise may differ from that in place domestically to be sure,
but a requirement that foreign sellers achieve a level of safety,
quality, or any other regulatory objective that domestic firms
need not achieve seems transparently protectionist, with rare exception.32 Accordingly, a covenant against regulatory protectionism must generally prohibit such regulatory policies.
The legal principle that condemns additional requirements
for foreign firms is known generally in the WTO system as the
"national treatment principle," which forbids governments from
treating imported goods differently than domestic goods. With
particular reference to product market regulations, the TBT and
' The TBT Agreement is reprinted in Documents Supplement at 149-69 (cited in note
5). The TBT Agreement is a successor to the GATT Standards Code, negotiated during the
1970s. The TBT Agreement is considerably more comprehensive in its substantive provisions than the GATT Standards Code, and, unlike the Standards Code, to which only a
subset of the GATT membership acceded, the TBT Agreement applies to all WTO members.
" The SPM Agreement is reprinted in Documents Supplement at 121-33 (cited in note
5). The covered measures include regulations to protect plants and animals from entry of
diseases or pests; regulations to protect human and animal life from dangers associated
with food additives or contaminants; measures to protect human health from diseases carried by plants or animals; and all measures intended to protect against the spread of
pests. SPM Agreement, Annex A, Definition 1.
"Occasionally, measures that might seem to discriminate against imports from a particular source could be justified because of dangers unique to that locale-"mad cow" disease, for example, may be limited for a time to Great Britain, and might justify a ban on
British cattle imports only.
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SPM Agreements both contain tight national treatment requirements.33
2.

Policing protectionist motives: The sham principle and
scientific evidence requirements.

An additional weapon against regulatory protectionism is the
"sham principle," under which the actions of regulators may be
directly reviewed for improper motive. A "sham" arises where the
purported high-minded objectives of regulation are disingenuous
and the real motive is found to be protectionist-where the regulatory measures are "a disguised restriction on international
trade."34 The sham principle is related to nondiscrimination principles in that evidence of discrimination is powerful evidence of
protectionist motives, but it has the potential to reach nondiscriminatory regulations as well when their true objective is to
disadvantage foreign firms. Also related to the sham principle are
rules that require nations to provide credible scientific evidence
to support claims made by domestic regulators, such as claims
relating to health and safety risks. Such rules may be strengthened by a requirement that sensible procedures be followed in assessing the need for regulation in the first instance.
The WTO Agreements embrace these antiprotectionist devices. The TBT Agreement provides: "Members shall ensure that
technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a
view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade."3 5 The corresponding language in the SPM
Agreement states that "[slanitary and phytosanitary measures
shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade." 6 Both agreements further require regulators to engage in a proper assessment of the
risks and other matters relating to the regulations in question be-

The TBT Agreement provides that "in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in
any other country." TBT Agreement, Art 2.1 (cited in note 30). The corresponding provisions of the SPM Agreement require member governments to "ensure that their sanitary
and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members." SPM Agreement, Art 2(3) (cited in note 31). This softer
language in the SPM Agreement is intended to permit "discrimination" of sorts when the
relevant threat to human, animal, or plant life or health is associated with goods only
from certain countries.
GATT 1994, Art XX (cited in note 20).
"TBT Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 30).
SPM Agreement, Art 2(3) (cited in note 31).
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fore promulgating them." The SPM Agreement is particularly
strong in this regard, with a lengthy article devoted to the principles of risk assessment." These provisions in particular were central to the ruling in favor of the United States in the beef hormones dispute.3 9
3.

The information deficiencies of regulators: Comment
requirements and reference to international standards.

As noted earlier, regulatory protectionism need not result
from a calculated effort to raise rivals' costs. Inadvertence, indifference, and information deficiencies on the part of domestic
regulators can also produce important regulatory trade barriers.40
One device for addressing this problem is a procedural requirement that regulators consider comments on proposed regulations
before promulgating them. Advance comment requirements allow
foreign firms to provide regulators with information bearing on
the wisdom of their proposed regulations, including information
about the costs of compliance to foreigners and alternative methods to achieve the regulatory objective at lower compliance cost.
Both the TBT and SPM Agreements thus require regulators to
publicize new regulatory proposals and to allow reasonable time
for comments by foreign parties before adopting them (with appropriate exceptions for urgent matters of health, safety, or secu41
rity).
Another important device for remedying the information deficiencies of regulators involves using international standards. A
number of international institutions develop and publish voluntary product standards (including standards relating to quality,
health, and safety),4' and it is often desirable that regulators use
TBT Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 30); SPM Agreement, Art 2(2) (cited in note
31).

The SPM Agreement requires members to ensure that "any sanitary or phytosanitary measure... is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence [except as an interim measure in the face of scientific uncertainty]."
SPM Agreement, Art 2(2) (cited in note 31). Detailed risk assessment procedures are set
forth in SPM Agreement, Art 5.
See text accompanying note 3.
Food additive regulations that prohibit additives not on an approved list, for example, may result in the prohibition of imports containing additives known elsewhere to be
perfectly safe.
"' TBT Agreement, Art 2.9.4, 2.10 (cited in note 30); SPM Agreement, Annex B,
$ 5(d), 6 (cited in note 31).
"The International Organization for Standardization has jurisdiction to address design, safety, and quality concerns in product markets across the board, and publishes
thousands of standards as a result of its work. The Codex Alimentarius, affiliated with the
United Nations, focuses mainly on food safety issues. A miscellany of other entities with
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these standards in their own national regulations.' International
standards are typically produced only after an extensive exchange of information among countries and thus tend to avoid
some of the problems that may result when national regulators
act on the basis of limited information. In addition, because international standard-setting institutions generally operate under
a consensus or super-majority voting requirement," the existence
of an international standard can reflect a high level of agreement
about its acceptability and the absence of a major constituency
that would be disadvantaged by its implementation. Accordingly,
unless a pertinent international standard is demonstrably inadequate to achieve a particular regulatory objective, its use often
will constitute the least trade disruptive method of achieving that
goal. The WTO Agreements thus impose an obligation to employ
international standards whenever they suffice to achieve the domestic regulatory objective.45
Finally, just as it is valuable for regulators to use international standards when possible, it is valuable to have international standards established on the basis of the best information
available. Accordingly, to improve the quality of information at
the international level, the WTO Agreements require national
regulators to participate in the activities of the international
standardizing bodies "within the limits of their resources."4"
4.

Information costs and the costs of regulatory
surprise for foreign firms: The role of notice and
publication requirements.

Firms invariably incur costs to learn about the regulatory
systems in the various markets that they serve. They may need
to translate regulations into another language, hire lawyers to
explain the regulations to them, and even incur substantial costs
trying to identify who is in charge of regulating particular matters and where their regulations may be found in an accessible
standard-setting functions includes the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Institute on Refrigeration, the International Commission on Illumination, and others. See Sykes, Product Standardsat 58-60
(cited in note 8) (listing international standardization organizations).
See id at 61-62 (describing the problem of incompatible broadcast formats for highdefinition television and suggesting that incompatibility could be avoided if nations followed standards set by the International Radio Consultative Committee).
See id at 59-60.
TBT Agreement, Art 2.4 (cited in note 30); SPM Agreement, Art 3(1), 3(3) (cited in
note 31).
"TBT Agreement, Art 2.6 (cited in note 30); SPM Agreement, Art 3(4) (cited in note
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form. These costs tend to be greater for foreign firms than for
domestic firms because of language barriers and unfamiliarity
with political and bureaucratic systems abroad. Similarly, foreign
firms may be disadvantaged unnecessarily by regulatory change
or "surprise." Greater advance notice of impending regulatory
changes can confer at least a transitory competitive advantage.
And because domestic firms tend to be better informed about and
more involved in their own political systems than foreign firms,
the costs of regulatory surprise seem likely to fall more heavily on
foreign firms.
Publication requirements under the WTO address the unnecessary costs that foreign sellers may incur in attempting to learn
about existing regulations and how to comply with them. The key
provision in each Agreement concerns the establishment of designated "enquiry points"--in effect, national clearinghouses for
information about all regulations with which foreign products
must comply.' These requirements not only avoid unnecessary
costs to foreign firms by reducing search costs, but also reduce
costs associated with the uncertainty that some regulation may
have been overlooked.
Notice requirements, which require the publication of new
regulations substantially in advance of their effective date (barring emergencies), address the unnecessary costs of regulatory
surprise. Accordingly, both the TBT and SPM Agreements contain substantial notice requirements.48

' TBT Agreement, Art 10.1 (cited in note 30); SPM Agreement, Annex B, 1 3 (cited in
note 31). Developed country members also have an obligation to make all pertinent information available in English, French, and Spanish if requested to do so by another member. TBT Agreement, Art 10.5; SPM Agreement, Annex B, 1 8. For good measure, a specific nondiscrimination rule prohibits charging more for such information when it is sold
to foreign firms than when it is sold to domestic firms. TBT Agreement, Art 10.4; SPM
Agreement, Annex B, T 4.
"Any time a new regulation would depart from an established international standard, or would address an issue on which no international standard exists, advance notice
must be given in the form of "notice in a publication at an early appropriate stage, in such
a manner as to enable interested parties in other Members to become acquainted with it."
TBT Agreement, Art 2.9.1 (cited in note 30). Substantially equivalent language in the
SPM Agreement may be found in Annex B, 9 5(a) (cited in note 31). Direct notice must
also be provided to the WTO Secretariat indicating what products would be covered by the
proposed regulation and how it would depart from any relevant standards promulgated by
international agencies. TBT Agreement, Art 2.9; SPM Agreement, Annex B, T 5(b)-(c). Exceptions exist, as one might expect, where urgent matters of health, safety, or national security preclude this advance notice. TBT Agreement, Art 2.10; SPM Agreement, Annex B,
9 6. All regulations must also be "published promptly" when they are adopted. TBT
Agreement, Art 2.11; SPM Agreement, Annex B, 9 1.
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Avoiding other unnecessary costs of regulatory
compliance: The least restrictive means requirement.

Regulatory objectives often can be achieved in a variety of
ways. Food safety can be promoted by inspecting processing facilities, for example, or by testing the finished product. Fire
safety can be promoted by chemically treating otherwise flammable materials or using nonflammable materials. When an objective can be achieved in a variety of ways, firms may differ as to
which method is the cheapest for them. This difference is especially likely in international commerce, where technologies and
input prices will vary from country to country. Regulations that
require their objectives to be achieved in limited ways that are
advantageous to domestic firms can thus confer an inefficient
economic advantage on them.4 9 Likewise, exporting firms can become subject to redundant regulatory requirements that increase
their costs of doing business without being necessary to the attainment of regulatory objectives in the firms' export markets.5 °
One solution is to require that regulations be drafted at the
highest possible level of generality that suffices to meet regulatory goals; put differently, the law can require that regulators
employ the least restrictive means necessary to achieve their objectives. Thus, for example, a regulation governing fire doors in
commercial buildings might be drafted to require a certain burnthrough time for every door, but should not be drafted to require
the use of particular materials or particular thicknesses where
satisfactory performance can be achieved without them. Similarly, a regulation concerning automobile emissions might be
drafted to require that emissions of particular pollutants fall below certain levels, but should not be drafted to require the use of
a particular emissions control technology when others are available or may become available. The general principle that these
examples illustrate is that product performance regulations are
almost always preferable to product design regulations.
Even if nations attempt to draft regulations in such a manner as to employ the least restrictive means, however, limited information may handicap their efforts. Other nations may employ
regulatory means that achieve the same objectives in a way not
'" The caveat is that if conformity assessment costs are sufficiently lower under a system that limits the options allowed to achieve a given end, the savings may be worth the
costs of foreclosing certain otherwise acceptable methods of achieving regulatory goals.
' Meat packing plants in country A may become subject to the slaughtering process
regulations of country B, for example, even though post-slaughter testing for various residues and contaminants by inspectors in country A is enough to ensure that the meat satis-

fies the health standards of country B.
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initially recognized by the importing nation. Where this problem
arises, importing nations can avoid regulatory protectionism by
accepting the regulations of other nations as equivalent in response to an appropriate petition-in legal parlance, they can afford each other "mutual recognition."
Each of these ideas finds its way into the WTO Agreements.
The least restrictive means principle is embodied in the requirement that regulations not be more trade restrictive than "necessary" to the attainment of their legitimate objectives.5 ' The corollary preference for performance rather than design regulations
appears expressly in the TBT Agreement.5 2 Finally, both the TBT
and SPM Agreements encourage mutual recognition in appropriate cases.53
6.

Additional obligations with respect to
conformity assessment.

The principles set forth to this point can be applied not only
to the substantive regulations of national governments, but also
to the methods used to ensure compliance with them. For example, regulations that require goods to be tested at a particular
laboratory or by a particular method when equally good alternatives are available can surely inflate the costs of conformity assessment unnecessarily. Requirements for testing or inspection
by nationals of the importing nation, or testing or inspection on

The TBT Agreement provides that "technical regulations shall not be more tradeSuch legitimate objecrestrictive than necessary to fulfil [sic] a legitimate objective ....
tives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices;
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment."
TBT Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 30). The SPM Agreement's version of this principle
requires members to "ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." SPM Agreement,
-,Art 2(2) (cited in note 31).
TBT Agreement, Art 2.8 (cited in note 30) ("Wherever appropriate, Members shall
specify technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance
rather than design or descriptive characteristics.").
' The strongest requirement is contained in the SPM Agreement: "Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent ...if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures
achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection."
SPM Agreement, Art 4(1) (cited in note 31). The TBT Agreement is softer, requiring that
"Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Members... provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately
fulfil [sic] the objectives of their own regulations." TBT Agreement, Art 2.7 (cited in note
30). This weaker language amounts at least to an obligation to give reasons for refusing to
accept foreign regulations as equivalent, which should raise the costs of disingenuous refusals to do so.
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the soil of the importing nation, may also be unnecessary and invite abuse and capture.
Accordingly, the WTO Agreements specifically extend most of
the principles set forth above to conformity assessment. A national treatment obligation exists,54 sham principles apply,55 a
general least restrictive means requirement is in place,55 nations
shall not require information that is not reasonably necessary to
conformity assessment," nations must process imported goods as
expeditiously as they process domestic goods,58 nations may not
site testing facilities so as to disadvantage foreign goods,59 notice
and publication requirements apply,"0 and nations are required to
use international conformity assessment standards where they
will achieve their purposes.61 Among other things, these requirements prohibit nations from engaging in selective enforcement of
facially nondiscriminatory regulations.
In summary, the TBT and SPM Agreements contain a wide
variety of principles that collectively have the effect of preventing
member nations from deliberately or inadvertently engaging in
regulatory protectionism. Any such measure-whether in the
form of a substantive regulation or a procedure for assessing conformity with a substantive regulation-can be reached under one
or more of the legal obligations set out above.
Notice, however, what the WTO Agreements do not prevent.
Nations that genuinely wish to pursue nonprotectionist regulatory objectives may do so as long as scientific evidence supports
the regulatory policy (or during an interim period of scientific uncertainty) and as long as the least trade restrictive measures are
employed to achieve the regulatory goal. The stringency of a given
regulation on a given subject, therefore, is of no concern to the
WTO. Nor are the trade effects of stringent regulations, even if
large, as long as the regulation complies with the obligations set
forth above. The system neither requires nor permits any "balancing" of the adverse trade effects of regulation against the importance of the regulatory goals to be achieved.

TBT Agreement, Art 5.1.1 (cited in note 30); SPM Agreement, Annex C, I 1(a) (cited
in note 31).
TBT Agreement, Art 2.2; SPM Agreement, Art 2(3).
TBT Agreement, Art 5.1.2; SPM Agreement, Annex C, 1(e).
TBT Agreement, Art 5.2.3; SPM Agreement, Annex C, 1(c).
TBT Agreement, Art 5.2.1; SPM Agreement, Annex C, 1(a).
TBT Agreement, Art 5.2.6; SPM Agreement, Annex C, 1(g).
TBT Agreement, Art 5.6; SPM Agreement, Annex C, 1(b).
TBT Agreement, Art 5.4; SPM Agreement, Annex C, 1 1.
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C. The Political Economy of the WTO Rules
1.

The prohibition on regulatory protectionism.

When nations enter into cooperative agreements on matters
of mutual interest, we might expect that such agreements, much
like private contracts, would result in a state of affairs in which
the welfare of one party cannot be enhanced without detriment to
the welfare of another (Pareto optimality). This notion is no doubt
correct most of the time, but the "welfare" measure for the parties
needs to be specified with some care.
It is a commonplace in the economic literature on trade policy to observe that consumer interests, which are strongly implicated by national trade policy, are poorly organized and vastly
underrepresented in the political calculus. Likewise, not all producer interests are equally well-organized or influential. These
facts explain the emergence of tariffs, quotas, and other trade restrictive measures in the first instance, despite their adverse effect on national economic welfare in most cases. 62
Just as conventional welfare economics cannot afford an adequate explanation of national trade policies formulated in isolation, so too does it fail to provide an adequate explanation for the
particulars of cooperative trade agreements. For if trade agreements such as those that comprise the WTO had as their objective the maximization of economic welfare in the conventional
sense, the level of protection permissible in accordance with such
agreements would be negligible.63 Yet, as indicated above, tariffs,
quotas, and protective subsidies are widespread in the WTO system (although they are subject to important constraints on their
magnitude, a key point as shall be seen). A convincing positive
theory of cooperative trading arrangements, therefore, cannot
rest on conventional welfare economics, but must instead explain
why the political optima embodied in trade agreements deviate
importantly from economic welfare optima.
The public choice perspective on international trade agreements begins with the observation that trade agreements are
compacts not among nations, but among their self-interested poFor an introduction to the welfare economics of protectionism, see Jagdish N. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, Lectures on InternationalTrade 105-25 (MIT 1983); Kenen, The
InternationalEconomy at 167-92 (cited in note 11).
"Even when protectionist measures are plausibly beneficial from the selfish perspective of an importing nation-such as when that nation possesses monopsony power in
world markets or can divert rents or positive externalities to its domestic industry from
foreign industries-they are nevertheless usually detrimental from a global perspective.
See generally Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Lectures on InternationalTrade at 174-84 (cited
in note 62); Paul R. Krugman, RethinkingInternationalTrade 233-42 (MIT 1990).
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litical officials. These officials are typically interested in maximizing their political fortunes measured by such things as votes,
campaign contributions, and government revenues that can be
spent in various ways to secure political support. Thus, a Pareto
optimum achieved by a trade agreement will be a political optimum, tending to achieve the Pareto frontier for the political officials who enter the agreement on behalf of their countries, subject to the internal political constraints that confront each official.' If this perspective is correct, trade agreements will result in
changes in national trade policy only if such changes enhance the
political fortunes of signatory politicians by generating net votes
or campaign contributions, by raising government revenues that
can be used for other politically valuable purposes, or by benefiting them (net) in some other way.
This analysis provides a ready explanation for the observation that trade agreements tend to be trade liberalizing rather
than trade restricting. When nations formulate trade policy in
isolation (as they did in the 1930s before GATT), they may take
the trade policies of other nations as largely fixed."5 The trade
policy battle then tends to be fought mainly by import-competing
interests who favor protection and certain well-organized importconsuming interests who favor liberalization. When nations have
the opportunity to cooperate, however, export interest groups become more important players, for they can then reward their political officials for securing better access to foreign markets during the course of trade negotiations. Because the pro-trade export
interests have more influence on policy when nations are cooperating rather than acting in isolation, the result is a greater degree of trade liberalization when nations act cooperatively than
when they act unilaterally."6

See generally Robert E. Baldwin, The Economics of the GATT, in Peter Oppenheimer, ed, Issues in InternationalEconomics 82 (Oriel 1980) (analyzing the relationship
between the political and economic objectives served by the GATT); Sykes, 58 U Chi L Rev
at 274-78 (cited in note 12) (analyzing the political aspects of the GATT through the lens

of public choice theory).
In economic parlance, they become Cournot-Nash actors. See Augustin Cournot, Researches Into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (MacMillan 1897)
(originally published in 1838); John Nash, EquilibriumPoints in N-Person Games, 36 Proc
Natl Acad Sci 48 (1950).
" The fact that nations acting unilaterally may sometimes anticipate retaliatory or
conciliatory moves by other nations in response to their own does not change the analysis
importantly-what matters is that negotiations over cooperative agreements make the returns to exporters much more precise and certain and thus increase their returns from
participating in the trade policy process. See Sykes, 58 U Chi L Rev at 281 (cited in note

12).
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The public choice perspective also can explain why trade
agreements do not achieve complete liberalization. Trade concessions on tariffs reduce government revenues directly, a fact that
may be troublesome to incumbent politicians for a variety of reasons. Likewise, not all export interest groups are equally wellorganized, and some import-competing interest groups are exceptionally well-organized and influential at any given point in time.
It would be quite surprising if the coalition of export interests
and import-consuming interests favoring liberalization triumphed all the time in every industry in every country, and indeed it
does not. Rather, trade liberalization only occurs to the extent
that the consumer and export interest groups who benefit from it
are well-organized and prevail in the political process over the
import-competing interest groups (and perhaps the politicians
concerned about tariff revenue) who resist trade liberalization.
The same perspective further suggests why political officials
acting either unilaterally or cooperatively would not be indifferent among the various instruments of protection available to
them, and why regulatory protectionism has come to be so disfavored in the trading community. Return for a moment to the
analysis accompanying Figure I above, which presents a welfare
comparison of tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and regulatory protectionism.6 7 In that comparison, each instrument is used to achieve
the same level of protection for import-competing domestic firms.
The reader will recall that tariffs and quotas are then similar in
their welfare consequences, except that tariffs create government
revenue whereas quotas tend to confer an equivalent amount of
surplus on private sector firms that hold the property rights to
import under the quota. Subsidies are also potentially similar to
tariffs and quotas in their welfare effects, except that the potential tariff revenue becomes consumer surplus, and subsidies introduce distortions elsewhere associated with taxation in other
markets. Regulatory protectionism, by contrast, destroys considerable additional surplus that can be as large as the foregone rectangle abcd of tariff revenue, quota rents, or consumer surplus
that exists under the other three options.
This welfare comparison suggests a very simple political
economy analysis that can explain why regulatory protectionism
would be prohibited in the trading community while the other
protectionist instruments are not. It rests on the imminently
plausible assumption that the political fortunes of officials in
trading nations tend to rise as producer surplus in their econoSee Section 1.
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mies increases, other things being equal, and as their government
revenue increases, other things being equal.
Using this assumption, consider first the political interests of
officials setting trade policy in isolation from other nations. An official desiring to protect a domestic industry under these circumstances may prefer a tariff to any other instrument of protection.
The reason is that the tariff yields government revenue and the
other instruments do not. In cases where foreign retaliation is of
great concern, however, or where officials prefer to bestow surplus directly on well-organized domestic producer groups (perhaps because of constraints on how officials may spend the tariff
revenue), a quota may be preferred to a tariff. The quota can be
structured to "bribe" foreign producers with quota rents to discourage foreign retaliation, or can be structured to bestow quota
rents directly on domestic importers. Occasionally, a subsidy may
dominate a tariff or quota from a political standpoint if domestic
consumers of the good in question are quite well-organized (most
likely a consuming industry) and would punish their politicians
for a loss of consumer surplus attributable to protection. Thus, it
is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which any one of these
three instruments might be the first choice for protecting a domestic industry.
But what about regulatory protectionism? Unlike the tariff,
it produces no government revenue. Unlike the quota, it creates
no quota rents to be bestowed on domestic importers, or on foreign producers who might otherwise move their governments to
retaliate. And unlike the subsidy, it does nothing to preserve consumer surplus in the market in question. In short, regulatory
protectionism seems demonstrably inferior to each of the alternatives from the perspective of political officials setting trade policy
in isolation. They can achieve the same level of protection for any
domestic industry using a tariff, quota, or subsidy, while conferring additional surplus on the treasury, on foreign suppliers or
domestic importers, or on domestic consumers, and reaping the
attendant political rewards.
Consequently, if nations were unconstrained in their ability
to use the protectionist instrument that they most prefer, we
would expect to see very little regulatory protectionism. Each nation acting unilaterally would almost always choose one of the alternative policies.
Now consider the situation that confronts parties to a cooperative trade agreement. In particular, let us suppose that nations have constrained themselves in their ability to employ tariffs, quotas, and subsidies by virtue of the trade agreement. This
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is a realistic description of the WTO, as shown above, because of
the widespread existence of tariff bindings and the associated
constraints on any quotas and subsidies that would frustrate expectations associated with the bindings. Let us further assume
that nations take all of these commitments and constraints seriously and would incur a substantial reputational penalty or retaliatory sanction should they deviate from them. Finally, imagine for a moment that the hypothetical trade agreement embodies
no constraints on regulatory protectionism.
On these assumptions, the temptation to use regulatory protectionism seemingly arises where it did not exist before. The
reason is quite simple: import-competing interests would always
like more protection. And if the trade agreement permits nations
to afford such protection through regulatory measures and not
through other measures, regulatory protectionism would become
a tempting way to provide it. Among other things, it might be
used in a way that constitutes implicit cheating on the bargain,
frustrating the expectations created by tariff bindings through a
regulatory protection loophole.
If cheating is the concern, of course, a complete prohibition
on regulatory protectionism might seem unnecessary. Rather,
parties to a trade agreement could simply adopt the same rule
that the WTO applies to subsidies-just as a new subsidy program that frustrates the expectations associated with a tariff
binding is impermissible but subsidies in general are not, so
might new regulatory protectionism be prohibited. Yet, if the
analysis above is right, all regulatory protectionism will be new
following the entry into force of the trade agreement, since there
is no reason to utilize it prior to the establishment of constraints
on the preferred instruments of protection. Hence, a complete
prohibition on regulatory protectionism and a prohibition on new
regulatory protectionism will amount to the same thing. Accordingly, we might expect trade agreements generally, and the WTO
in particular, to prohibit regulatory protectionism altogether. At
least for the WTO, that expectation has already been shown to be
correct in practice.
Much the same conclusion can be reached another way, albeit using a somewhat stronger assumption about the welfare
functions of political officials. In particular, suppose that the expected joint political surplus of officials who are parties to the
bargain increases with the sum of global producer surplus and
government revenue. Put differently, suppose that ex ante, producer groups in general are expected to be equally well-organized
and influential, and that officials are indifferent between a dollar
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of producer surplus (which they will be rewarded for generating)
and a dollar of government revenue (which they can use to bestow
largesse and thus induce political rewards). Though no doubt
oversimple," this assumption does generate the result that tariffs
or quotas will always dominate regulatory protectionism-an inspection of Figure I reveals that tariffs and quotas both generate
a larger sum of producer surplus and government revenue than
regulatory protectionism at any given level of protection. If regulatory protectionism always moves political officials off their Pareto frontier, it will be in their interest to prohibit it.
To this conclusion I add one clarification and two observations about the further benefits of a prohibition on regulatory
protectionism. Trade agreements, like private contracts, are subject to ex ante uncertainty and thus to changing circumstances
that may (from a political standpoint) warrant departures from
prior commitments. This set of issues lies at the heart of some
previous work on the GATT escape clause, which suggests that
the reimposition of protection for an industry in economic difficulty may at times be justifiable as a politically valuable adjustment of trade commitments.6 9 When such circumstances arise, a
mechanism for the adjustment of commitments is required. And,
if the adjustment of commitments with respect to tariffs, quotas,
and subsidies were unduly costly, regulatory protectionism might
be useful as the lesser among evils. In fact, however, the WTO
system contains elaborate provisions facilitating the renegotiation of tariff commitments that make this concern quite implausible. Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 provides for the renegotiation
of any tariff commitment, for example, and protects the expectations of other parties with a compensation requirement.7" Article
XIX provides for the reimposition of protection for troubled (and
thus politically vocal) industries using tariffs and quotas.7 Thus,
it should always be better to renegotiate over the more efficient

' It has been argued elsewhere that this assumption may not be a bad approximation
of the ex ante reality that confronts trade negotiators, and that it may have considerable
purchase in explaining the terms of trade agreements. For example, it can explain the existence of the most-favored-nation clause of the WTO/GATT system, GATT 1994, Art I
(cited in note 20), which generally forbids tariff discrimination among trading partners
(with some interesting and perhaps also explicable -exceptions). See generally Schwartz
and Sykes, 16 Intl Rev L & Econ 27 (cited in note 12).
See Sykes, 58 U Chi L Rev at 289-99 (cited in note 12).
GATT 1994, Art XXVIH (cited in note 20).
11 Id Art XIX. See also Roessler, Schwartz, and Sykes, Economic Structure of Renegotiation and DisputeResolution at 11 (cited in note 22) ("ift may be politically efficient...
to afford transitory protection to import-competing industries suffering severe dislocation,
at the expense of growing and prosperous foreign competitors.").
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instruments of protection than to introduce the costs of regulatory protectionism.
One additional benefit of a prohibition on regulatory protectionism relates to an observation made in the introduction to this
Article-regulatory protectionism need not be deliberate. Regulators may act often with limited information, or without meaningful input from those affected by their decisions. This problem is
likely to be particularly acute when those disadvantaged by
regulation are foreign firms. International legal agreements that
prohibit regulatory protectionism, such as the TBT and SPM
Agreements of the WTO, require central governments to pay
much greater heed to the implications of their regulations for
trade. In significant part, these agreements may be aimed not
just at deliberate cheating but also at the costs of inattention and
inadvertence in a diffuse bureaucracy. Otherwise, the unwitting
destruction of joint surplus through regulations that unnecessarily burden foreign suppliers may become a serious problem. Efforts to avoid such problems by international agreement ensure
that protection is afforded only where it is, on balance, politically
valuable, and only in a manner that destroys as little surplus for
well-organized interest groups as possible.
A second additional benefit of a prohibition on regulatory
protectionism relates to the problem of quantifying the amount of
protectionism in the system in order to facilitate reciprocal market access negotiations. The central objective of the original
GATT, now furthered by the WTO, was to make politically valuable, reciprocal market access commitments to enable exporters
to expand their sales.72 In the course of negotiation over these
commitments, officials needed to know what they were giving and
what they were getting. Tariffs provide a clear metric in this regard. A 20 percent tariff will inflate the price of imports to consumers by 20 percent, other things being equal. Exporters and
their representatives can thus evaluate the impact of tariffs on
export prices rather easily and thereby assess the market access
opportunities at differing tariff rates. Regulatory protectionism,
by contrast, is much less transparent in its effects. Consider the
beef hormones example in the introduction: A prohibition on the
importation of hormone-raised beef will raise costs of exporters by
some amount that relates to the costs of segregating animals
treated with hormones from those not so treated, the costs of certifying that the animals were properly segregated, and so on.
These costs may be quite uncertain and variable--are they com2 See Baldwin, Economics of the GATT at 83-87 (cited in note 64).
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parable in their effects on trade to a 10 percent tariff? a 20 percent tariff? The answer may be quite unclear, and thus it is helpful for negotiators to have protectionism channeled into an instrument such as a tariff that has a more readily identifiable impact on prices and market access opportunities."
2.

The absence of balancing.

What remains for discussion from the political economy perspective is the absence of any "cost-benefit" or "balancing" rule
within the WTO to weed out regulatory measures that serve
genuine nonprotectionist objectives where the regulatory benefits
are small and the adverse trade impact great. Much of the explanation for this absence lies in the fact that such welfare-reducing
measures (using "welfare" in the conventional sense of modern
welfare economics) need not be welfare-reducing from a political
standpoint. Indeed, if rigorous cost-benefit analysis were the
touchstone of policy, virtually all tariffs, quotas, and subsidies
would fail to pass muster because of the deadweight losses evident in Figure I. Those measures, and others like them, survive
because political officials care not only about the magnitude of
costs and benefits, but also about their incidence. Modest benefits
to a well-organized interest group can readily outweigh larger
costs to a diffuse and poorly organized interest group in the political calculus.
For the same reason, objective cost-benefit analysis is not the
proper metric from a political perspective for the evaluation of
nonprotectionist regulations that have an adverse trade impact. 4
' One additional bit of history fits nicely with this political economy analysis. The
GATT began in 1947 with a series of tariff bindings negotiated among the major trading
nations of the time. Initially, the only constraints on regulatory protectionism were those
of GATTI Article MI, the national treatment Article. But with time, due to the constraints
on tariffs, quotas, and subsidies that the GATT introduced, regulatory barriers to trade
became more important. During the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations during the 1970s,
some GATT signatories responded by negotiating a "Standards Code" that went considerably beyond the national treatment requirement, though it fell well short of the obligations now embodied in the TBT and SPM Agreements. The perceived deficiencies in the
Standards Code led to additional pressures to constrain regulatory protectionism, culminating in new WTO Agreements. The history of legal obligations under the GATT and
WTO is detailed in Sykes, ProductStandards at 63-86 (cited in note 8). In short, the international constraints on the traditional instruments of protectionism came first, and the
more elaborate and detailed constraints on regulatory protectionism followed later as nations became increasingly creative in devising new forms of protective regulations. This
pattern of legal developments lends support to the notion that regulatory protectionism is
of little political utility in an environment where nations are unconstrained in their trade
policies, but becomes important once their preferred instruments of protection are disabled.
' This observation is hardly novel, at least not in the domestic context, as it underlies
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The constituency favoring a regulation may be well-organized
and influential, and the constituency that suffers from it (and
particularly from the adverse trade effects) may be poorly organized. A simple balancing of the economic costs and benefits of the
regulation can mask these important distributional concerns.
To be sure, the political officials who enter a trade agreement
such as the WTO ideally might like to subject regulations with
important adverse effects on foreign trade to a political costbenefit analysis, asking whether the net impact of the regulation
on the political interests of WTO members is positive or negative.75 I have already argued that regulatory protectionism fails
such a cost-benefit test and is accordingly prohibited. But where
the regulation in question advances some genuine regulatory objective other than protectionism, only a case-by-case analysis of
its political costs and benefits can determine whether it is a net
benefit or a net detriment from a political standpoint. Categorical
prohibitions, such as those described above, are no longer useful.
But legal tribunals will have great difficulty conducting any
sort of political cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis. Scientific and economic experts can provide much of the information
necessary for a tribunal to engage in conventional cost-benefit
analysis, but the information for an assessment of the political
interests of national officials, and the intensity of the concerns on
each side, will be largely inaccessible. Moreover, political officials
likely would be appalled at the thought of an international tribunal balancing the political considerations on each side and transparently upholding or striking down regulations on political
grounds. I suspect that virtually all political officials would prefer
to maintain the illusion that regulation is undertaken solely for
high-minded reasons.
Accordingly, the WTO does not entrust its dispute resolution
process with the task of balancing the political costs and benefits
much of the modem economic theory of regulation. See, for example, George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971); Peltzman, 19 J L
& Econ 211 (cited in note 13); Richard A. Posner, Theories of economic regulation, 5 Bell J
Econ & Mgmt Sci 335, 344-50 (1974).
7' As a formal matter, the inquiry would be whether the political benefit to officials
who favored the regulation (presumably those in the importing country) outweighed the
political detriment to officials who disfavored the regulation (presumably those in the adversely affected exporting countries, whose exporters are upset about a loss of market access). In theory, this interpersonal welfare comparison can be made using the "weights"
that are implicit in the political Pareto optimum for the trade agreement in question. For
a formal treatment, see Sykes, 58 U Chi L Rev at 300-03 (cited in note 12). If such a system could be implemented, all political officials could benefit on average so that ex anteat the time the trade agreement is concluded-each official would find the system beneficial.

HeinOnline -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 32 1999

19991

Protectionismand InternationalTrade

of national regulations that are necessary to the attainment of
genuine regulatory goals other than protectionism. Once a regulation is determined to have this property, it is simply upheld under both the TBT and SPM Agreements. Of course, where a legally permissible regulation has considerable adverse effects on
export interests abroad and is of little political value to the officials in the importing country, another avenue exists for getting
rid of it-negotiation. A side payment by officials in the exporting
nation(s), in the form of a concession on other trade matters or
perhaps some unrelated matter of mutual interest, can induce officials in the importing nation to change its policy. As Ronald
Coase noted long ago, such negotiation alone can suffice for parties to achieve a Pareto optimum as long as the transaction costs
of bargaining are small enough."
Indeed, a Coasean perspective can organize the entire political economy analysis. Officials who enter trade agreements seek
to attain their political Pareto frontier. To a considerable degree,
they do so through sector-by-sector, product-by-product bargaining over tariffs and other instruments of policy, resulting in
highly detailed commitments on each imported and exported
good. Likewise, when circumstances change and one party introduces a new policy that affects the welfare of others, the same
process of detailed bargaining can restore the Pareto optimum.
But bargaining is costly; to economize on bargaining costs it is at
times useful to have categorical rules that apply to all products
and markets, enforced by a dispute resolution system. This option
is appealing when optimal behavior is more or less the same in
all product markets, and when that optimal behavior can be
achieved by a legal rule that is reasonably precise and straightforward to apply. Regulatory protectionism, as I have defined it,
is always suboptimal from a political perspective and can be defined in its particulars by a set of fairly clear legal rules-the
rules described in Section B above. The task of policing regulatory protectionism is thus an appropriate one for the quasijudicial dispute resolution of the WTO. By contrast, it is exceedingly difficult to devise a workable and palatable legal rule to
condemn regulatory measures that are necessary to nonprotectionist regulatory goals but that are nevertheless undesirable because of their trade impact. As a result, this task is left to caseby-case bargaining.

6 Ronald

Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).

HeinOnline -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 33 1999

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[66:1

III. SOME COMPARATIVE NOTES ON OTHER
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS

The WTO is by no means the only trading arrangement that
confronts the problems of regulatory protectionism. Others include the NAFTA, the European Union, and the United States
federal system. If the analysis to this point is right, we might expect strong pressures to prohibit regulatory protectionism in all
of these systems. Each of them imposes substantial constraints
on the tariffs, quotas, and subsidies that subsidiary jurisdictions
might otherwise use to protect their firms from foreign competition. These constraints should in turn lead to pressure to use
highly wasteful regulatory protectionism if it is not effectively
prohibited. We might also expect that nonprotectionist regulatory
measures would be treated with less hostility, even where their
effects on trade are great. A quick review of the law of these other
systems suggests that these expectations are borne out in the
main.
A. The NAFTA
The NAFTA is an agreement under which Canada, Mexico,
and the United States afford significant tariff preferences to each
other that are not afforded to other trading nations.77 Like the
WTO, it includes constraints on quotas and subsidies to avoid
frustrating expectations under the negotiated preferences.
The NAFTA was negotiated more or less concurrently with
the negotiations that led to the WTO, and the proposals in each
tended to filter through the other. Perhaps not surprisingly,
therefore, the provisions of the NAFTA relating to regulatory protectionism bear striking resemblance to those of the Uruguay
Round TBT and SPM Agreements. Both the NAFTA chapters on
technical barriers78 and on sanitary and phytosanitary measures79
incorporate by now familiar WTO principles including the national treatment requirement; the sham principle; obligations to
See generally North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), reprinted in
Documents Supplement at 489-710 (cited in note 5). Free trade agreements are authorized
by Article XXIV of the original GATT, which remains part of the WTO system in GATT
1994. Article XXIV constitutes the principal exception to the most-favored-nation requirement of the WTO system that ordinarily prohibits discrimination among trading
partners. To invoke the Article XXIV exception, parties to free trade areas must eliminate
barriers to trade on "substantially all" trade between them. See GATT 1994, Art XXV(5),
(8) (cited in note 20).
NAFTA, Part Three, Technical Barriers to Trade, Chapter Nine: Standards-Related
Measures (cited in note 77).
NAFTA, Part Two, Trade in Goods, Chapter Seven: Agriculture and Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Section B ("NAFTA SPM Chapter") (cited in note 77).
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give reasons; notice, publication, and comment requirements; obligations to use international standards; and least restrictive
means principles. The chapters extend these obligations both to
substantive regulations and to conformity assessment.
Although there are a number of modest differences in wording between the pertinent NAFTA and WTO provisions,"° the
NAFTA, like the WTO, can fairly be said to prohibit regulatory
protectionism."' Similarly, the NAFTA is tolerant of nondiscriminatory regulatory measures that have protective effects but that
can be justified as essential to nonprotectionist objectivesNAFTA too requires no "cost-benefit" balancing between
regulatory benefits and adverse trade impact.
B.

The European Union

The European Union, like the NAFTA, affords trade preferences to its members. It has the familiar property of constraining
the use of protectionist instruments that nations would ordinarily
want to use, thereby raising the danger of regulatory protectionism as a substitute.
1.

Legislative response.

Unlike the WTO and the NAFTA, the European Union has
legislative authority that can be used to address regulatory protectionism. That authority has been used extensively. The Treaty
Establishing The European Community ("Treaty of Rome")
authorized the European Council of Ministers,8 2 upon a proposal
from the European Commission," to issue directives to "approxi-

For example, the NAFTA SPM Chapter requires that no measure be maintained
"where there is no longer a scientific basis for it." Id Art 712(3)(b). In the WTO SPM
Agreement, by contrast, the obligation is not to be maintained "without sufficient scientific
evidence." SPM Agreement, Art 2(2) (cited in note 31) (emphasis added). The NAFTA requirement can be read as less stringent (the difference between "some scientific basis" and
"sufficient scientific evidence"), and if so, the NAFTA provision prevails in a dispute between the parties to the NAFTA. See NAFTA, Article 103 (cited in note 77).
" For further discussion, see Sykes, Product Standardsat 108-09 (cited in note 8) (discussing the NAFTA accords on technical barriers and SPMs).
' The Council is the primary legislative body in Europe, from which most Community
legislation emanates. It consists of country representatives (Ministers) that act in accordance with various voting rules, dependent upon the subject matter of the action. See
Treaty Establishing The European Community, [1992] 1 CMLR 573, reprinted in Neville
March Hunnings and Joe MacDonald Hill, eds, The Treaty of Rome Consolidated and the
Treaty of Maastrict, Common Market Law Reports Reprints (Sweet & Maxwell 1992)
("Treaty of Rome").
' The Commission is a group of distinguished citizens, acting in their individual capacity rather than under the direction of their home countries, charged with undertaking
many of the initiatives required by the Treaty of Rome. Typically, as here, the Commission
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mate" (in other words, harmonize) the measures of Member
States that "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the
common market."8' The old approach to harmonization through
Council initiatives involved the product-by-product promulgation
of detailed technical regulations. Products that met the specifications could circulate freely within the Community, although
Member States were sometimes free to require their own producers to meet a different set of technical specifications. In the mid1980s, the Commission and the Council embraced a new approach that delegates the detail work to others. For the most
part, the Council limited itself to setting out the "essential requirements" that products must meet relating to matters such as
health, safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection.85 The Council can then refer the task of formulating detailed
standards that meet the essential requirements to Europe-wide
standardization organizations. Once the detailed requirements
are established, Member States must conform their national laws
and regulations to them, subject to an "escape clause" that permits nations to deviate on grounds such as public morality; protection of human, animal, and plant life and health; protection of
intellectual property; and protection of the environment. A product that conforms to the resulting standards, or that conforms to
national measures deemed "equivalent" by the Commission, is
presumed to meet the essential requirements and is entitled to be
marketed freely within the Community, again subject to an escape clause.86
makes proposals to the Council, which then acts upon them, subject at times to the requirement that it seek advice from other entities such as the European Parliament. The
Parliament has relatively little power. For a general description of the governmental
structure of the Community, see Josephine Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law 10-19 (Blackstone 3d ed 1992).
Treaty of Rome, Art 100 (cited in note 82).
The 1989 "Machinery Directive" affords a nice illustration. Council Directive of 14
June 1989 on the approximationof the laws of the Member States relating to machinery,
1989 OJ (L 183) 9. It includes some general principles of safe construction for machinery,
such as to "eliminate or reduce risks as far as possible," and to "take the necessary protection measures in relation to risks that cannot be eliminated." Id at (L 183) 15. It then proceeds to a higher level of detail, discussing the need for integral lighting for certain types
of machinery, the importance of readily accessible devices to stop all moving parts, the
need for controls to avoid accidents due to power supply interruptions, the need for measures to ensure stability against vibration and other disturbances, the importance of eliminating sharp edges, and on and on. Id at (L 183) 16-27. The directive thus addresses virtually every conceivable type of product hazard, and lays down general principles for
avoiding each of them. Yet, the directive applies to a vast array of machinery products.
Indeed, its application extends to virtually every product that in common parlance might
be called a "machine," with a few enumerated exceptions such as "mobile equipment,"
"medical equipment," "steam vessels," "firearms," and several others. Id at (L 183) 11.
See Bernard van de Walle de Ghelcke, Gerwin van Gerven, and Koen Platteau, The
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For product regulations covered by either old or new harmonization directives, a clear consequence of a directive is the
elimination of any regulatory protectionism that might result
from differences in the substantive regulations promulgated by
national regulators. Although the escape clauses permit Member
States to adopt more stringent regulations where they can justify
them on the basis of goals other than protectionism, any cost disadvantage imposed on foreign firms due to differences in regulatory requirements will require justification before the Commission and perhaps the European Court of Justice as well.
Like the WTO, the European Union has also taken additional
steps to eliminate regulatory protectionism that may result from
regulatory "surprise" or from information deficiencies on the part
of regulators. A 1983 Mutual Information Directive 7 requires national standard-setting organizations and regulators to notify the
Commission and certain European standard-setting organizations of proposed standards or regulations before their adoption.
With respect to regulations in particular, Member States must
notify the Commission of proposed regulations. The Commission
then disseminates that information to other Member States. Either the Commission or another Member State may object to a
proposed regulation and request that it be modified to avoid adverse trade effects. The Commission may also opt to prepare a
harmonization directive on the subject. In either case, final adoption of the proposed regulation must be delayed until the matter
is resolved."
The global approach to conformity assessment89 is another
important innovation. It encourages all parties involved in certification and testing-both product manufacturers and third-party
testing laboratories-to embrace European quality control standards to govern their activities. And once the European quality
assurance standards are in place, additional guidelines specify
when and where the necessary testing and certification for each
product will occur. These guidelines minimize the cost and intrusiveness of testing and certification while still meeting essential
regulatory objectives.
New Approach to the Elimination of Technical Barriersin the European Community, 1990
BYU L Rev 1543, 1551-60 (detailing the European Community's product standards requirements).
' Council Directive of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technicalstandardsand regulations, 1983 OJ (L 109) 8, 9.
Id at (L 109) 8-11.
European Commission, A Global Approach to Certification and Testing, Commun
89/209 of June 15, 1989, 1989 OJ (C 267) 3.
' See generally id at (C 267) 15-24.
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Judicial response.

Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome provides that: "Quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited
between member-States."9 ' Among the subsequent provisions in
the Treaty, one pertinent to regulatory measures is Article 36:
"The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports... justified on grounds of public
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national
treasures . . . ; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade." 2 This structure should by now
seem quite familiar-protectionism is prohibited, bona fide regulation to achieve other objectives is not.
These Articles of the Treaty raise a number of interpretive
issues, implicitly left to the Commission and to the Court of Justice. It was settled quickly that Article 30 would have broad applicability and, in particular, that it would encompass all manner
of regulatory barriers. A 1969 directive from the Commission
stated that product regulations can have an "equivalent effect" to
quantitative restrictions. 94 In the view of the Commission, product regulations applicable to imports exclusively ("distinctly applicable measures") were automatically covered by Article 30, and
regulations applicable to domestic and imported goods alike ("indistinctly applicable measures") would be covered or not in accordance with a balancing test. It was necessary to inquire
whether "the restrictive effects on the free movement of goods are
out of proportion to their purpose," and whether "the same objective can be attained by other means which are less of a hindrance
to trade."95 This early interpretation by the Commission goes beyond mere prohibition of regulatory protectionism, of course, and
hints at a more general balancing of regulatory benefits against
the costs of trade reduction. In 1974, the Court of Justice took an
even more expansive view of the measures that might run afoul
91 Treaty of Rome, Art 30 (cited in note 82).

Id Art 36 (emphasis removed).
See Commission Directive of 22 December 1969 based on the provisions of Article
33(7), on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by otherprovisions adopted in pursuanceof the EEC
Treaty, 1970 OJ (L 13) 29.
Id.
Id at (L 13) 31.
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of Article 30 in the case of Procureurdu Roi v Dassonville:8 "All
trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions."9 7 The Dassonville
formulation makes no distinction between distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures and requires no balancing test as under the 1969 directive. It does require actual or potential "hindrance" of trade, a concept that has proven elusive to define. Because any regulation or conformity assessment measure that
prohibits the importation of a good or substantially increases the
cost of importation would surely qualify, however, the details of
the "hindrance" concept need not detain us.
The Court later backed away from the broad sweep of its
Dassonville test in a case known popularly as Cassis de Dijon."
The Court held that "disparities between the national laws ...
must be accepted insofar as those provisions may be recognized
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements
relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer."9 The list of mandatory
requirements to which the court refers was subsequently held not
to be exhaustive.' ° After Cassis, therefore, the Court applies a
two-tier test: For measures applicable to imports exclusively, the
Member State must justify them on the basis of the Article 36 criteria noted above.'0 ' Measures that are applicable to both domes[1974] ECR 837, 851 (holding that a provision of Belgian law "prohibiting the import
of goods bearing a designation of origin where such goods are not accompanied by an official document... certifying their right to such designation constitutes a measure having
an equivalent to a quantitative restriction").
Id at 852.
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649
("Cassisde Dijon").
" Id at 662.
"®Theencouragement of cultural activities, for example, or the interest in maintaining
"national or regional socio-cultural characteristics," can qualify as mandatory requirements. See Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law at 86-87 (cited in note 83) (listing cases after
Cassis de Dijon that apply the mandatory requirements exception).
"'Article 36 requires some interpretation. With reference to regulatory barriers to
trade, the two provisions of greatest relevance are the exception for measures to protect
human, animal, and plant health, and the "public policy" exception. The latter has been
construed very narrowly, however, and has proven to afford essentially no protection to
Member States outside of a few areas of little pertinence here. See id at 95. Thus, as a
practical matter, the only Article 36 exception likely to be of any use to the importing nation in a dispute is the health exception. Given the breadth of the Dassonville test for
measures within the scope of Article 30, therefore, trade barriers that result from distinctly applicable regulatory measures will almost certainly be struck down unless a
health justification can be shown.
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tic and imported goods, however, may be justified on the basis of
mandatory requirements not enumerated in Article 36. Those
that fail this test cannot be applied against imports, and the Cassis decision itself indicates that the Court will scrutinize the purported nonprotectionist justifications for a regulation closely.0 2
Further, a presumption exists that products lawful in one State
ought be allowed into another, and the Court can force a kind of
"mutual recognition" where the regulations in force in the exporting nation achieve all the legitimate objectives of the importing nation, even if they do so in a manner that differs from
the importing nation's own approach.0 3
In sum, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
has evolved in a manner quite similar to the WTO rules. Discriminatory regulations are extremely difficult to sustain, and
nondiscriminatory regulations with adverse trade impact must
employ the least trade restrictive means for the attainment of
nonprotectionist regulatory goals. Mutual recognition will be required where no violence to legitimate regulatory objectives will
occur. Finally, despite some hints to the contrary in earlier
statements by the Commission, there is little "balancing" of nonprotectionist regulatory benefits against the burden on commerce.
C. The United States Federal System
The inefficiencies of noncooperative trade policies under the
Articles of Confederation are said to have provided much of the
impetus for the Constitution of the United States.' 4 Like the
[1974] ECR at 853.
'"A survey of cases may be found in Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law at 87-91, 96-97
(cited in note 83). For some illustrative decisions, see EC Commission v Greece (Re Beer
Purity Standards),[1988] 1 Common Mkt L Rep 813, 818-20 (holding that prohibitions on
beer imports with certain additives violate Article 30 in substantial part because no scientific evidence could be adduced of any health hazard); EC Commission v Germany (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), [1988] 1 Common Mkt L Rep 780, 799 (same); EC Commission
v United Kingdom (Re UHT Milk), [1983] 2 Common Mkt L Rep 1, 16 (holding that requiring an extra UHT treatment on imported milk and cream is unreasonable and thus
violates Article 30 as equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports); EC Commission
v United Kingdom (Re Imports of PoultryMeat), [1982] 3 Common Mkt L Rep 497, 519-20
(holding that import restrictions on food products violated Article 30 because the Court
was unpersuaded that the health justifications were bona fide or that the least restrictive
means had been employed); EC Commission v Italy (Re Low-Fat Cheese), [1992] 2 Common Mkt L Rep 1, 16 (holding that the least restrictive means to protect consumers was
labeling rather than prohibition on nonconforming products); EC Commission v Germany
(Re German Sausages), [1989] 2 Common Mkt L Rep 733, 741-42 (same); EC Commission
v Germany (Re the Use of Champagne-Type Bottles), [1988] 1 Common Mkt L Rep 135,
143-44 (same); Miro BV, [1986] 3 Common Mkt L Rep 545, 559-60 (same).
04
" See Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 404-06 (Foundation 2d ed
1988).
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other trading arrangements above, the Constitution imposes a
number of restrictions upon the use of traditional protectionist
instruments by the states, such as a prohibition upon export or
import duties without the consent of Congress." 5 It also grants to
Congress the "power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States"0 6 (the Commerce Clause),
thereby affording Congress the power to constrain state action
expressly through statutory enactments. But not all restrictions
on state activities in the commercial sphere are express. State
policies that are in tension with federal regulatory policy may be
deemed implicitly preempted by the federal regime.' 7 And, even
when the Congress has taken no action on a subject pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, state action may be found to violate the
Constitution because of the negative implications of that clausethe so-called dormant or negative Commerce Clause.'
This allocation of powers has much to say about the treatment of regulatory protectionism within the United States. Congress has eliminated regulatory trade impediments in many areas (though sometimes as an incidental consequence of federal
regulation). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, for example, establishes a federal mechanism for the approval of prescription
drugs that preempts state drug regulation.' 9 The Federal Communications Act affords the FCC authority to establish television
broadcast formats."0 The Ports and Waterways Safety Act,"' by
promulgating safety rules for the design of tanker vessels, preempts more stringent state standards."' Innumerable other examples might be offered.
Yet, many regulatory barriers remain outside the scope of
federal legislation, even under the implied preemption doctrine.
States and localities maintain their own building codes, health
regulations, pollution control regulations, and a wealth of other
product-related measures. These regulations are a source of im-

'" 6US Const, Art I, § 10, cl2.
10

Id§ 8, cl 3.

See Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw at 479-501 (cited in note 104).
"This listing of constitutional restrictions upon state actions that affect commerce is
not intended to be exhaustive. Other and sometimes similar constraints emanate from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and a range of other pro-

visions.
09

In general, the Act delegates the authority to promulgate regulations to an agencythe Food and Drug Administration-and allows the agency to decide whether to give its
regulations preemptive effect. 21 USC §§ 301 et seq (1994).
11047 USC § 151 (1994).
1133 USC § 1221 (1994).
" See Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co, 435 US 151, 168 (1978).
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pediments to commerce domestically and have been a matter of
considerable interest internationally.
The WTO accords afford foreign nations some legal basis for
challenging these state regulations on the basis of the principles
laid out earlier. State regulations that are inconsistent with the
requirements of the TBT and SPM Agreements can place the
United States in violation of international law and thus lead to
initiatives by the federal government to correct the problem."'
Another source of constraints on protectionist state and local
regulations, which can be invoked directly by domestic and foreign firms affected by those regulations, is the dormant Commerce Clause. Modern analysis in dormant Commerce Clause
cases begins with the question of whether the challenged practice
effectuates a "legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental."" 4 If any discrimination
against interstate commerce is to be tolerated in pursuit of a legitimate interest, it must be because of the absence of adequate
"nondiscriminatory alternatives.""' Finally, whenever a demonstrable burden on interstate commerce exists, with or without
discrimination against out-of-state producers, the Court will
weigh the interests of the state against the burden. Discriminatory policies are likely to be struck down under this balancing
analysis, while nondiscriminatory policies are "upheld unless the
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."" 6
On its face, this doctrine automatically invalidates any substantive state regulation that creates regulatory protectionism as
defined in this Article. It requires national treatment in virtually
all cases absent a compelling regulatory justification for its absence, and the balancing test implies a least restrictive means requirement." 7 More generally, any time a regulatory measure is
not necessary to achieve some state regulatory objective other
than protectionism, the burden on commerce is self-evidently "excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Accordingly, the dormant Commerce Clause has been used
regularly to invalidate state measures that amount to regulatory

...
Note that the states are not per se bound by the WTO Agreements. But the United
States is under an international obligation to police compliance by the states and, to avoid
international sanctions for a violation, can bring an action to strike down inconsistent
state laws. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 USC § 3512(B)(2)(A) (1994).
" Pike v Bruce Church,Inc, 397 US 137, 142 (1970).
"Hunt v WashingtonState Apple Advertising Commission,432 US 333, 353 (1977).
'Pike, 397 US at 142.
" See Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw at 436-38 (cited in note 104).
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protectionism. 1 18 Examples of measures struck down by the courts
include: a prohibition by one state on imports from another that
display a quality standard developed by the other state;..9 a requirement that milk be pasteurized and bottled locally; 2 0 prohibitions on the importation of food products from outside a defined
radius in which state inspectors would operate;' 2 ' a requirement
that eggs imported from out of state be stamped with the two letter postal code for the state of origin;'22 and requirements that
domestic electric utilities either continue to use domestic high
sulfur coal or incur substantial regulatory burdens for failing to
use it. 3
To be sure, the operation of the dormant Commerce Clause
has proven controversial in some respects, particularly as to the
application of the balancing test. Determining whether the local
public interest is "legitimate," whether nondiscriminatory alternatives are "adequate," and whether the local benefit outweighs
the burden on commerce can require difficult value judgments
that judges have no special capacity to make and that are ordinarily entrusted to the political branches of government. Further,
if balancing of interstate burden against local benefit is taken seriously, it requires a wealth of empirical information that often
will be unavailable in United States courts. For these and other
reasons, commentators are often critical of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, as are a number of prominent jurists. Laurence
Tribe suggests that: "The Supreme Court's approach to Commerce Clause issues.., often appears to turn more on ad hoc reactions to particular cases than on any consistent application of
coherent principles."" 4 Now Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in a
1981 dissent: "The true problem with today's decision is that it
gives no guidance whatsoever to these States as to whether their
"The dormant Commerce Clause assuredly does less than, say, the WTO or the
NAFTA to police the process by which regulations are promulgated and the attendant information and costs of regulatory surprise that may afflict foreign firms. This is perhaps
an unavoidable consequence of a system that rests on ex post challenges to regulations
through the judicial system as opposed to the renegotiation required under the WTO or
the NAFTA. Further, these kinds of costs may well be less important in the United States
federal system where language barriers are absent and transparency of government
regulatory operations is more commonplace.
"'Hunt,432 US at 350-54.
'Dean Milk Co v City of Madison, 340 US 349, 356 (1951); Dean Foods Co v Wisconsin Departmentof Agriculture, 478 F Supp 224, 231-32 (W D Wis 1979).
'"Millerv Williams, 12 F Supp 236,242 (D Md 1935).
'"United Egg Producersv Department ofAgriculture of Puerto Rico, 77 F3d 567, 572
(1st Cir 1996).
'Alliance for Clean Coal v Bayh, 72 F3d 556, 559-60 (7th Cir 1995); Alliance for Clean
Coal v Miller, 44 F3d 591, 595-96 (7th Cir 1995).
' Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw at 439 (cited in note 104).
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laws are valid or how to defend them .... We know only that [the
challenged state] law is invalid and that the jurisprudence of the
'negative side' of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused." 5 Among the law and economics scholars, Frank Easterbrook and Edmund Kitch have argued that the dormant Com12 6
merce Clause strays beyond the limits of judicial competence
and may even be unnecessary given the realities of competition
and the incentives for cooperation among the states."
It is instructive that these criticisms are directed mainly toward the balancing analysis in cases that purport to weigh the
importance of the state's regulatory goals against the attendant
burden on commerce. Where the state's proffered nonprotectionist
objective seems genuine and the state has employed the least restrictive means to achieve it, it is indeed difficult to imagine how
a court is to determine whether the attendant burden on commerce nevertheless outweighs that objective. But such cases, by
'Kassel v Consolidated Freightways Corp, 450 US 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist dissenting).
'See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, 11 Geo Mason U L Rev 53,
58 (1988); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in A. Dan
Tarlock, ed, Regulation, Federalism and Interstate Commerce 9, 46-47 (Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Hain 1981). Justice Scalia has at times expressed similar views. See CTS Corp v
Dynamics Corp of America, 481 US 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia concurring) (arguing that the
Pike inquiry is ill-suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at
all"). Richard Posner, however, takes a more charitable view of the doctrine. See Richard
A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 Geo Wash U L Rev 4, 17 (1987)
("The 'negative' commerce clause is one device... for preventing states from abusing their
'market power'."). For the argument that a proper constitutional interpretation does not
support the creation of a dormant Commerce Clause by the judiciary, see Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance ofFederalism,1987 Duke L J 569.
'Proposals for reform of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine abound. Easterbrook
and Kitch impliedly argue that much of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine ought be
abandoned, leaving the Congress to police state malfeasance under the "positive" Commerce Clause. See Easterbrook, 11 Geo Mason U L Rev at 61 (cited in note 126); Kitch,
Regulation and the American Common Market at 42-45 (cited in note 126). Donald Regan
urged the Court to reject its "balancing" exercise in favor of an inquiry into whether the
challenged practice has a "protectionist motive," an approach that he contends is followed
already to a considerable degree in the guise of balancing language. Donald Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
84 Mich L Rev 1091 (1986). Saul Levmore favors greater attention to the question of
whether a challenged practice imposes substantial costs on citizens of other states by exploiting state market power, or whether instead the economic costs of the practice are
borne mainly within the jurisdiction. Saul Levmore, InterstateExploitation and Judicial
Intervention, 69 Va L Rev 563, 626-29 (1983). A similar proposal, though directed to the
proper application of the "state action" doctrine under the antitrust laws, is that of Frank
Easterbrook. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism,26 J
L & Econ 23, 45-49 (1983). For the argument that the aggregate efficiency consequences of
state legislation will not depend systematically on whether the state is able to exploit nonresidents, see Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and InsiderTrading, 1987 S Ct Rev 47, 74-78.
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definition, are not cases of regulatory protectionism. Whatever
the particular criticisms of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
therefore, even the critics seemingly exhibit near consensus on
the idea that regulatory protectionism as it is defined here ought
to be, and is, prohibited under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The battle joins when courts go beyond that prohibition to strike
down nonprotectionist regulations that unavoidably place significant burdens on commerce.
On this set of issues, perhaps the United States can learn
from the international agreements that confront the same problems. The pattern in the WTO, the NAFTA, and the European
Union is much the same: balancing regulatory benefits and burdens is neither authorized nor undertaken in the judicial or
quasi-judicial process. When a regulatory objective appears to be
genuine and nonprotectionist, all that is required is the least
trade restrictive means to achieve it. The remaining burdens on
commerce resulting from heterogeneous domestic regulations and
conformity assessment systems are left to case-by-case negotiation in the WTO or the NAFTA, or to the European government
in Brussels in the case of Europe. The regularity of that pattern
perhaps suggests its wisdom and thus may support the suggestion by a number of jurists and commentators that United States
courts ought to steer clear of balancing bona fide regulatory benefits against commercial burdens in dormant Commerce Clause
cases. I do not want to overstate the point, however, as I have
merely made the case that a balancing analysis is unlikely to be a
part of a politically savvy trade agreement-it is unlikely to move
signatory officials toward their Pareto frontier. Whether it may
nevertheless be defended on independent normative grounds is a
distinct issue, although I suspect that the argument against it
from a political efficiency standpoint-the inability of the judicial
process to measure the relevant costs and benefits accuratelymay counsel against it more generally.
CONCLUSION

Protection against foreign competition can be conferred
through a range of policy instruments with variable welfare consequences. Regulatory protectionism is generally the most pernicious of the familiar techniques. It holds little temptation for
savvy political officials who are free to select among the alternative instruments of protection, and emerges only after those officials become constrained in their choice of policy instruments.
This Article has suggested a political economy basis for expecting
a prohibition on regulatory protectionism to emerge in multilat-

HeinOnline -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 45 1999

The University of Chicago Law Review

eral trading arrangements, and has shown that a prohibition is in
fact present in the WTO, the NAFTA, the European Union, and
the United States federal system. This regularity is striking. It is
also fortunate as a normative matter, as it channels protectionism into the instruments that do the least damage.
Regulatory measures can have protective effects, however,
without constituting "regulatory protectionism" as defined
herein-measures that are nondiscriminatory and are essential
to the attainment of some regulatory objective other than protectionism may burden foreign firms. The WTO and NAFTA are tolerant of such measures, and, after a brief flirtation with judicial
balancing of the benefits and burdens, the European Union is
largely tolerant of them as well. United States doctrine is more
murky, and judicial balancing of regulatory benefits and commercial burdens is still undertaken to some extent. This aspect of
United States law has been the subject of intense criticism, however, and if the political economy analysis herein cannot settle
the debate as a normative matter, it can at least help us to understand its genesis.
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